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覆盖率4.9%(8 / 162 段)
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相似度中位数0.673
最高相似度0.718
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如何阅读先选来源,再选片段比较:上方为目标,下方为来源灰色方块:目标片段彩色方块:来源片段(颜色对应来源播客)实线:对齐片段对(颜色对应来源)线条透明度随相似度变化;最不透明的线条表示最强匹配

最高相似度示例 · 非人工确认结果

目标片段它的成员愿意参加漫长会议,愿意进行大量敲门动员审查候选人的政策立场,并且在初选中集中资源建制派选民往往只有在总统大选的时候,才会积极参与政治中的组织强度,可以弥补人口规模,一小群把选举视为历史斗争的人,经常能够战胜人数更多,却把选举视为日常行政选择的人,一个政党缺少公认领袖、统一纲领和稳定选民联盟的时候,更有组织、更有信念的派别,就有机会重新定义这个政党共和党建制派比民主党建制派更早崩溃,民主党只是多维持了几年OK 下一个分析。第三, 马姆达尼和特朗普具有重要的相似性,也存在着决定性差异。两个人的第一个相似点是,他们都以党内局外人身份挑战、失去性欲的建制集团2016年的共和党精英认为,特朗普粗俗无知, 缺乏执政能力,也相信他最终会在初选中自行崩溃。
来源片段It is possible to do that and patch together enough to win. But that kind of art of coalition building is not what Donald Trump is about. And I think more importantly it's not what Republican primary voters want. And the real challenge for both parties now in thinking about coalition building is to recognize. That their primary voters don't have their best interests at heart. Their primary voters want them to be adamant and vehement in opposition to the other party. And that's part of what they need to do. But they have to win more than their primary voters. Otherwise they don't win the election.

相似度 0.748 · The Good Fight · Yuval Levin on the Coming Realignment · 目标 26:43–27:17 · 来源 45:44–46:18

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  1. S1:8 个窗口回退
    1. S1来源 3:43–4:18目标 0:28–1:020.653

      来源片段

      You also talk very clearly about the diversity of the American Muslim community and all of those things and the challenges it faces and how they should face those challenges. Those things for me have been a window that has really enriched my understanding of that community. Also placed Mamdani, for example, as a phenomenon in that world. So I have learned a tremendous amount. So now that we've complimented each other, let's get into it. I'm going to start with the simplest question. Why did Zoran Mamdani win? I don't mean literally the electoral tactics, unless you want to talk about that, but this, and the surprising run of DSA successes. What, what is happening here?

      目标片段

      我也解释过,为什么美国的两党制和初选机制会,鼓励民主社会主义者从民主党内部夺取权力,而不是建立一个几乎注定失败的第三党参加竞选。今天我们沿着这个问题继续往前走。马姆达尼虽然是美国民主社会主义组织DSA最成功的政治人物却不能完全控制。DSADSA也不是一支围绕马姆达尼个人建立的竞选队伍,而是一个拥有独立纲领、组织网络和长期目标的社会主义运动。所以我们首先要认真看看这群美国社会主义者究竟相信什么?

    2. S1来源 6:26–7:02目标 6:43–7:160.701

      来源片段

      And it's the kind of collision of these different factors that have come together to create this incredibly ripe opportunity for a movement that is both genuinely radical, but that also derives enormous benefit from being seen as radical and outside a familiar American tradition. Now, that's a lot of words, but, you know, let me break it down a bit. You remember you lived in the United States for a long time, you know, your parents were Americans, so you know our country exceptionally well. And what you'll know is that for a long time, you know, Americans on the left really resisted the idea of being characterized as socialist. Even when their views were broadly consonant with those of social Democrats in the wider Western world, they resisted that term. You would call yourself a liberal, you might call yourself a progressive, but socialism, that term was anathema.

      目标片段

      社会主义这一套在美国长期遭到污蔽化的意识形态,为什么今天会重新成为美国年轻人的光荣身份,理解这个问题,首先要正视DSA及其周边激进左翼最鲜明的情感底色。他们对美国对西方文明以及对白人性怀有强烈的敌意。在他们的世界观中,美国很少被理解成一个虽有罪恶,但是有修正能力的现代共和国。美国。在他们心中是一个建立在奴隶制原著名土地掠夺、资本剥削和海外帝国主义之上的国家。西方文明也很少作为包含自由主义、宪政、科学革命和人权传统的复杂遗产出现,西方文明更常被压缩为殖民主义的历史主体。

    3. S1来源 6:57–7:30目标 8:43–9:160.718

      来源片段

      Even when their views were broadly consonant with those of social Democrats in the wider Western world, they resisted that term. You would call yourself a liberal, you might call yourself a progressive, but socialism, that term was anathema. That wasn't always true in American life. If you go back to the early 1900s, the movement of Eugene Debs, you know, there was a very vigorous socialist movement in this country. But basically from the 1930s on, you had the stigmatization of socialism and communism. And I think all of your listeners know why. Then enter the millennial generation.

      目标片段

      我在我之前有一期播客叫做美国,为什么没有成为一个马克思主义国家里面详细介绍过美国社会主义发展史,其中美国历史上最重要的社会主义政治家Eugene Debs多次参加美国总统选举社会主义者,在部分工业城市、移民社区和工会中拥有真实且广泛的影响力。然而,从20世纪30年代开始,特别是在斯大林主义暴行逐渐曝光,冷战全面展开之后,社会主义和共产主义在美国都背负了沉重的污名自由派。即使支持社会保障、工会权力、公共医疗和累进税,也往往自称是liberal或者是progressive自由派或者进步派,

    4. S1来源 7:22–7:59目标 9:43–10:150.656

      来源片段

      But basically from the 1930s on, you had the stigmatization of socialism and communism. And I think all of your listeners know why. Then enter the millennial generation. Enter a generation that felt dispossessed, demoralized, really out of love with this romantic American story. You know, imagine that you were someone who, you know, you were a kid when 9-11 happened. You saw the Iraq war, the war in Afghanistan. You saw these wars essentially end in a kind of failure. Then you saw the 2008 financial crisis. Maybe you were affected by it. You also see a generation that is very disproportionately immigrant and second generation, particularly from some parts of the world that often had an oppositional sensibility with respect to the West, at least in the more educated and elite corners of those populations.

      目标片段

      对于出身在1980年代以后的人来说,苏联已经消失。古拉格东欧共产党政权和和对抗逐渐成为遥远的历史知识。社会主义给美国社会带来的恐惧,缺少直接的社会记忆、资本主义制度的失败,却构成了他们成长过程中真实的现实经验。千禧一代童年或青少年时期经历过911。随后看到美国发动阿富汗战争和伊拉克战争,美国政府以民主自由和国家安全名义发动战争,最终留下长期占领财政负担,

    5. S1来源 11:43–12:15目标 16:44–17:160.684

      来源片段

      But there was a minority of them who were romantics, who had some, maybe a different noble understanding of themselves. There's a noble understanding of being someone who loves your family and fights and scraps to provide for them and to lead a dignified life and to honor your fathers and forefathers. But there's another nobility that derives from a cosmic outlook on the world. And I do think that right now is a moment where that cosmic outlook for a certain kind of young American is a lot more ennobling and attractive than the meritocratic rat race. I think that that's something that's very true, particularly if you feel as though you've been a loser in the meritocratic rat race, whether that's kind of objectively or otherwise.

      目标片段

      一个人越接近白人,西方男性、富裕和主流,他就越需要反思自己的特权。他的原罪就是特权。这套道德结构给来自移民家庭和全球南方的年性知识分子提供了特殊位置。他们未必拥有父母一代的宗教知识和文化实践,却可以把阻籍转化为政治资源。相较于在漫长的职业道路上成为医生律师或者大学教授,成为反殖民主义的发言人,能够更快地让他们获得公共认可。我再说的就是巴姆达尼大学和媒体,尤其愿意倾听一个能够以个人身份讲述全球压迫结构的人,

    6. S1来源 62:29–63:01目标 18:14–18:450.670

      来源片段

      However, I also felt that that was not where I could make it a unique contribution. And I also genuinely believe that that is more of a minority phenomenon, fundamentally, in the American Muslim community. And it's something that is necessarily limited to Muslims. Third-worldism is a phenomenon that, like communism, socialism, anarchism, is potentially something that can draw in anyone, but where there's a group of highly assimilated American Muslims who've been a powerful vector of this phenomenon.

      目标片段

      于是,最激烈的解释,往往拥有最高传播效率。我之前在分析马姆达那时候已经说过,他的穆斯林身份是他的政治身份中非常重要的组成部分。美国穆斯林青年的情况尤其值得观察。美国成年穆斯林人口非常年轻,而且接受高等教育的比例很高,这使大学成为美国穆斯林移民二代身份重构的重要场所,传统的移民清真寺,通常围绕礼拜家庭、族裔语言和社区互助组织生活。大学里的伊斯兰中心则把不同国家、不同阶级和不同教派背景的穆斯林学生聚集了起来,同时让他们与左翼学生组织后殖民理论和巴勒斯坦运动发生联系。

    7. S1来源 71:28–72:01目标 18:43–19:160.663

      来源片段

      Then you have people who identify as Muslims but are not necessarily grounded in a community. By the way, I'm one of them myself. You know, I identify as a Muslim. I'm a believer. However, I don't have the deep religious command that my parents did and I don't have the deep religious community that they did. I'm married to someone who's not a Muslim. You know, she actually knows a lot about it. so think about, you know, the mosque, the immigrant mosque in Brooklyn where I grew up versus the NYU Islamic Center.

      目标片段

      大学里的伊斯兰中心则把不同国家、不同阶级和不同教派背景的穆斯林学生聚集了起来,同时让他们与左翼学生组织后殖民理论和巴勒斯坦运动发生联系。在这个环境中,穆斯林开始获得一种超出宗教实践的政治含义。一个人可能不经常礼拜对古兰经和伊斯兰法缺乏任何系统了解,甚至在私人生活上相当开放和世俗,但他仍然可以拥有强烈的穆斯林政治身份。这里的穆斯林在美国语境中开始同时指向全球南方殖民主义受害者对西方霸权的抵抗巴勒斯坦事业,

    8. S1来源 77:29–78:00目标 19:14–19:450.675

      来源片段

      He's made his religious identity a central part of his political identity, and he has vowed not to bite his tongue in the face of Islamophobia. That gives him unique credibility and authority to speak out, and this is where you make enemies, against the chauvinism, extremism, misogyny, and racism that exist within Muslim communities, and that has translated into violence again and again. Those strains represent as much of a threat to Muslim American flourishing as any external forces. And right now, Muslim Americans are desperate for leadership that addresses their internal communal challenges.

      目标片段

      这里的穆斯林在美国语境中开始同时指向全球南方殖民主义受害者对西方霸权的抵抗巴勒斯坦事业,以及相对于白人西方的道德真实性。这种身份可以被称为是宗教上世俗政治上穆斯林宗教共同体原本通过礼仪戒律、家庭和代际传承塑造成员政治化的美国穆斯林身份更多通过校园活动、国际冲突和反殖民话语获得内容。对于美国的穆斯林移民二代而言,他还同时解决了同化造成的文化失落。

  2. S2:5 个窗口回退
    1. S2来源 10:05–10:41目标 0:28–1:020.735

      来源片段

      All the socialist candidates, not all endorsed by Mamdani, except one, maybe, except one, who ran for state legislature positions, won. This was a big shift. New York City is not New York State is not America, but it's a real sign of where the party is going and how detached its quote unquote leaders, including tribal leaders, black ones, Puerto Rican ones, Dominican ones, Jewish ones, are from from where popular sentiment is at the moment. So that's what happened. So let's let's go back a little bit. The first question I have is who is the DSA?

      目标片段

      我也解释过,为什么美国的两党制和初选机制会,鼓励民主社会主义者从民主党内部夺取权力,而不是建立一个几乎注定失败的第三党参加竞选。今天我们沿着这个问题继续往前走。马姆达尼虽然是美国民主社会主义组织DSA最成功的政治人物却不能完全控制。DSADSA也不是一支围绕马姆达尼个人建立的竞选队伍,而是一个拥有独立纲领、组织网络和长期目标的社会主义运动。所以我们首先要认真看看这群美国社会主义者究竟相信什么?

    2. S2来源 19:08–19:43目标 21:59–22:300.675

      来源片段

      And Israel's actions in recent years, both in terms of wars it's been involved in and the linemen with Trump, I think have have really helped that break through. And last thing, this DSA coach, you know, you flatly said in an interview with my friend Ben Max before the election, I thought was remarkably transparent in a way I wish Democratic leaders were. So I look, these are small races were worried about how they're going to end up and ended up doing very well. But we're doing this thinking about 2020 and what the Democratic Party is going to be and who we nominate to run against whomever the Republican is at that point, you know, in what's become Trump's party.

      目标片段

      他迫使原有共和党政治人物向他效忠,他让反对他的建制派逐渐失去提名机会和连任的机会。所以,当我在讨论DSA能否接管民主党的时候,我按照相同的标准判断社会主义者能否改变民主党的政策议程。道德语言候选人选拔机制和权力结构。我的判断是,美国社会主义者已经具备局部接管,民主党的条件也正在改变整个政党的发展方向。但是,他们暂时还没有复制特朗普全面接管的能力。未来几年最可能出现的局面是民主党在经济政策对以色列政策和对建制派的态度上明显马姆达尼化同时继续由多个左翼派别中间派和地方机器共同竞争。

    3. S2来源 32:39–33:12目标 25:57–26:300.696

      来源片段

      It's something that actually takes a long time to test out in politics. Like recognize that as a sincerity and authenticity test, and is this a party that is bound by its institutions and its history? Or is it one that that's sort of deciding from its members and its movement? You know, the DSA is the latter, and it has been successfully orchestrating in New York what amounts to a semi-hostile takeover of the Democratic Party and the WFP to some extent, with some willing hostages, if you will, no grim pun intended, like Brad Lander along for that ride.

      目标片段

      他们可以把住房、交通、医疗、教育和外交政策纳入同一套政治叙事,普通人的生活越来越困难,是因为资本和财富控制了国家民主党无法解决问题,是因为它依赖企业和资本的捐款。美国支持以色列是因为外交政策服务于帝国主义秩序,无论我们在何种程度上认可这套论证,它在叙事上是高度统一的。它像当时的特朗普主义一样,拥有明确的敌人和目标DSA人数仍然很少,但是它拥有比民主党建制派更强烈的组织意志。它的成员愿意参加漫长会议,愿意进行大量敲门动员审查候选人的政策立场,并且在初选中集中资源建制派选民往往只有在总统大选的时候,才会积极参与政治中的组织强度,可以弥补人口规模,一小群把选举视为历史斗争的人,经常能够战胜人数更多,

    4. S2来源 42:51–43:28目标 37:43–38:150.674

      来源片段

      But like, that's a lot of effort to ask people intellectually and emotionally and spiritually to put in all the time in an era of narrative warfare. And by the way, an era where there is no down ballot voting. So in some weird ways, these local races, you know, that are going to go upstream, maybe all the way to the presidential are part of like this new era where everyone thinks the same way up and down the ticket entirely. And there's almost no effort put into convincing convinceable people. The issue is, it is sort of a waste of time. Most of these elections are in fact decided in primaries, the fights are within the parties as much as they're between them. But I think, you know, for the sake of any national cohesion, for the sake of my personal like mental and moral cohesion, like standing by your own arguments as opposed to like hate reading those of people you don't like is like really, really important.

      目标片段

      商品化关闭全部海外军事基地。这些目标在深蓝选区的活动家中,可能具有极大的吸引力。但是,在全国大选中容易成为共和党的攻击材料。社会主义候选人想要赢得总统选举,就必须在坚持运动、忠诚和扩大选民联盟之间不断妥协,每一次妥协又会引发DSA内部的路线斗争。所以我的结论是,民主党正在被改变,但是,接管仍未完成。美国社会主义者或不会像特朗普接管共和党一样接管,民主党在议题层面接管已经开始,民主党对财富再分配住房、

    5. S2来源 49:04–49:39目标 39:29–40:020.676

      来源片段

      I just want to throw out, it seemed like not that long ago, there was a reaction to the progressive prosecutors and the rather left wing notions that there were crimes that shouldn't be enforced and that we had, it was, you know, the Democrats themselves said we can't we can't campaign on defund the police. It's like they memory hold that Chesapeake Dean in San Francisco was recalled. There was, I remember in 2024, it's not like Trump had a chance of like turning New York City red, but he managed to have a pretty high turnout rally and then I think it was the Bronx, you know, people came out for him.

      目标片段

      目前,更像2010年至2025年期间的查党,它已经削弱了建制派,已经在重新塑造候选人,却还在等待一个能够整合所有不满,并且夺取总统提名的人。因此,我们今天要问的更准确的问题,可能不是社会主义者能否原样复制特朗普,而是民主党还剩下多少能力阻止自身被重新定义。共和党建制派。曾经相信,特朗普只是一场短暂风波,只要等待他犯错,政党就会恢复正常。结果。所谓正常的共和党很快消失了。民主党建制派,现在也可能在犯同一种错误。他们把马姆达尼和DSA看作仅限于纽约的青年时尚政治接管,通常发生在一系列初选失败、政策退让和语言变化之中。

  3. S3:3 个窗口回退
    1. S3来源 15:58–16:32目标 0:57–1:320.705

      来源片段

      It's why we're not having debates about how to fix American education. And mostly we're having debates about exactly how the world would end if the other party won the election. And so I think it's very important for us now to ask some of the large, what I think of as sociological questions that underlie American political life, questions about the nature and health of American society, about the character of American institutions, questions that we don't ask when things are going well. We can pretend these things don't exist when things are going well.

      目标片段

      所以我们首先要认真看看这群美国社会主义者究竟相信什么?他们是想改革资本主义,建立北欧式福利国家,还是最终取代资本主义秩序。在此基础之上,我们再回答这个更大的问题。美国社会主义者会不会像2016年特朗普接管了共和党建制派一样,逐步接管整个美国民主党为什么社会主义在美国重新成为一种光荣身份?为什么少数知识分子能够影响远大于自身的人群?大学又如何把美国年轻人分散的不满,组织成一套激进左翼世界观?

    2. S3来源 27:55–28:33目标 7:14–7:450.706

      来源片段

      The thing in my mind that the Tea Party and the Trump movement had in common is a kind of one top what is the paranoid style in American politics. Perhaps you could call it the histrionic style in American politics, right? There's an element of claiming that the country is about to be lost forever. And in particular, lost to, lost to elite forces. I mean, there is a long tradition of this in American politics. It's Jacksonian. It's Jeffersonian. And it is ultimately a sense that the people in power are not on our side and anti-elitism that does pop up quite a bit in our history.

      目标片段

      西方文明也很少作为包含自由主义、宪政、科学革命和人权传统的复杂遗产出现,西方文明更常被压缩为殖民主义的历史主体。白人在这里已经超出肤色和族裔意义,成为资本主义、殖民主义父权制和全球霸权的总代号。因此,他们对于美国的批判,并不止于某一届政府,并不止视线于特朗普政府某一场战争或者是某一项不公正政策。他们怀疑美国政治共同体本身的历史合法性。按照这套逻辑,美国的繁荣来自掠夺美国的国际领导地位,来自帝国主义美国社会内部的普遍价值是统治集团将特殊利益包装成普遍原则的语言。

    3. S3来源 42:27–43:03目标 24:59–25:310.724

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      Would vote for Republicans that the kind of you know provincial notables would vote for Republicans. Trump has managed for very obvious reasons to scare many of those people into voting for the Democratic Party. Is it really possible to make new friends and keep the old. Is it possible to broadly expand Republicans appeal among working class voters. Without even just for purely economic and fiscal reasons. Making the party less attractive for you know the high earners in the professional class. The local notables who used to be the backbone of the party.

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      特朗普能够接管共和党,除了自身的政治能力,也因为共和党早已成为一个内部空洞的政党,党内精英支持自由贸易、削减福利和海外干预基层选民,却越来越关心移民、制造业衰退和文化冲突,共和党建制派、拥有组织和捐款,但是,他们失去了能够激发选民的政治语言。特朗普近来填补了这个真空,今天的民主党也出现了类似问题,他仍然拥有庞大的筹款网络工会,支持少数族裔组织和城市政治机器,但是却越来越难以解释自己在代表什么。党内领导人继续捍卫民主制度、多元主义和专业治理。