最高相似度示例 · 非人工确认结果
目标片段要迫使伊朗改变对海峡的政策，美国必须开始打击它真正关心的资产。国防工业技术体系、钢铁和石化工业发电厂、桥梁以及石油出口中心。比如说Kark Island这会向伊朗传递一个完全不同的信号。如果你继续争夺海峡，美国就不只是摧毁用于袭击船只的武器，而是让整个伊朗经济陷入失序，制造大规模失业，并且使战后重建变得更加遥远。当然，鹰派提供的路线的风险都是更高的，工业和民用基础设施，很可能引发伊朗对海湾国家的对称报复，最终把美国重新拖向4月初，它试图避免的全面战争。
来源片段the israelis and the is and the americans did a little bit of that during the war they hit the steel industry and they hit the petrochemical industry they didn't wipe the two out that was signaling to the iranians that that that we could cause massive dislocation uh uh you know massive unemployment complete shutdown of their economy if we hit carg island if we hit the defense technology industrial base we hit the power plants and bridges uh and we hit their petrochemical industry even harder that could potentially change the calculation but that also risks the escalation so i i think in order to get the the america to impose on the iranians the american definition of the mou there's going to have to be an escalation in kind not just in not not just in
查看片段位置
16 个展示片段 · 共 17 个展示片段（含上方示例）— 点击展开
来源片段
And phase one, I actually don't know how to endate it. But phase one seems to me to last from February the 28th to whichever day the administration begins to believe that whatever the theory of rapid victory was that they had is probably not going to come to pass.
目标片段
从2月28日到现在，这场战争大体经历了五个不同的阶段。第一个阶段从2026年2月28日，战争爆发，一直持续到特朗普，政府，意识到迅速获胜，是无法实现的。
来源片段
From April the 7th to 18 June, we have the period of the ceasefire with the dueling blockades for most of that time, the Iranian closure of the strait, the American blockade of Iranian ports. And then from 18 June until some point in the last week or so, we had the period of the memorandum of understanding, which was meant to open the strait, didn't really resolve any of the other issues turns out in retrospect, not really to have resolved the issue of the straight either. And now, Mike, we are at the dawn of some new phase, the parameters of which are being negotiated to include with bombs and missiles as we speak.
目标片段
美国利用海军金融制裁和对全球石油交易体系的控制，阻止伊朗获得出口收入第四个阶段，从6月18日的谅解备忘录生效开始一直持续到上一周吧。这份谅解备忘录的直接目的是暂时恢复。霍尔木兹海峡航运它没有解决伊朗核计划和美国制裁体系和伊朗石油出口以及海湖最终法律地位的长期等等。长期问题只是一个临时安排。第五个阶段就是今天特朗普宣布重新对伊朗港口实施海上封锁的这个阶段，美国和伊朗重新发生了大规模的交火。
来源片段
There's those really big picture strategic conflicts between the United States and Iran. And then there's a second frame, which would be the fight over the MOU.
目标片段
还是说只是把双方完全不同的理解，暂时写到了同一份文件里面，美国和伊朗现在直接发生冲突的不是第一组问题，而是第二组问题。
来源片段
Upon the signing of this MOU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only from the Persian Gulf. Can I stop you right there?
目标片段
比如说备忘录第五条的核心表述，本谅解备忘录签署后，伊朗伊斯兰共和国将尽最大努力做出安排，确保商业船只安全通行，仅在60天内不收取任何费用OK关键在于make arrangement做出安排这四个字。
S1：2 个窗口回退
来源片段
I mean, it's not there explicitly, but I think it's very strongly there implicitly. And so you do end up with the situation that we're in and with some textual justification for both sides, but I would say on balance with the Iranian side. And it just shows one hesitates to throw words like desperation around. But let's just say the real urgency of the American side, of the American team negotiating this to get something, anything signed that from their perspective was going to resolve the short to middle term issues well enough that we could transition to a discussion of long term issues.
目标片段
因为一个国家只有在被承认具有某种责任或权限的时候才可能做出安排，对吧？如果文件只是要求伊朗停止干扰自由航行，那你就完全可以使用停止袭击，不得妨碍之类的更加明确的措辞。这说明，美国谈判团队当时可能带着非常强烈的紧迫感，急于获得一份能够立刻恢复航运暂停战争的文件，因此接受了现在这个谅解备忘录里面具有根本歧义的文字。美方希望先解决短期问题，再把长期问题推到以后，伊朗则利用这种模糊性为自己主张海峡管辖权留下了空间OK如果这份谅解备忘录是如此的含糊，
来源片段
Because first of all, I don't know that they ever really believed they were going to get to the big negotiation over the Iranian nuclear program. I know that was Donald Trump's original goal, but he at a certain point realized he was not going to be able to compel them. And so like I said, there's another key article of the MOU from memory, I think it's article nine, but I haven't looked at the thing since it was written. But it talks about the nuclear status quo. So no change to the nuclear status quo. Again, like make arrangements, status quo is a very, very ambiguous statement. But from Donald Trump's point of view, what that meant is all of the fissile material remains in the ground.
目标片段
在我看来，特朗普看重的不是他能否立刻解决所有问题，而是他能否冻结局势？那么他冻结了什么局势？第一，他暂时重新开放霍尔木兹海峡。第二，他冻结了伊朗核计划的现状谅解备忘录中，还有一项关于核现状不得改变的条款，那么现状同样没有得到明确界定。但是美国的理解是，伊朗的高浓缩裂变材料继续留在遭到轰炸的地下设施中，伊朗不得重新进行又浓缩。自一年多以前的午夜之锤行动以来，伊朗已经停止了又浓缩。
来源片段
They haven't enriched uranium since Operation Midnight Hammer over a year ago. So that's one year out of the last 20 years, Iran has been enriching uranium every day except for the last during the last year.
目标片段
自一年多以前的午夜之锤行动以来，伊朗已经停止了又浓缩。在过去20年中，伊朗几乎每天都在推进浓缩活动，唯独过去一年没有进行，即使地下仍然有高浓缩，又仅仅把停止浓缩无限期固定下来。
来源片段
Let's go way out and start the clock on October the 7th, 2023. From that point till now, the power position of Iran in the Middle East has been massively degraded.
目标片段
从2023年10月7日到现在，伊朗的地区力量在事实上已经遭到连续削弱。我等一下会解释如何削弱？
来源片段
Iran begins this period as a meaningful competitor for regional hegemony, not as not as not as a competitor in its own mind, sort of divorced from its hard power capabilities or lack thereof like no, very serious hard power capabilities, massive missile arsenal, active nuclear program, a neo imperial regional network of proxies capable of doing real harm to American allies, American forces in the region, a country on the march. From then till now, it has been just punishing the Iranian economy and even worse, I mean, the Iranian it's not like things were going gangbusters in 2023 for the Iranian economy, but even worse shape, you know, running out of water in Tehran, for example, the Iranian nuclear program absolutely battered between midnight hammer and the 12 day war in 2025 and further strikes
目标片段
让我们先来看一看伊朗在过去三年中的损失，在2023年10月7日，加沙战争之前，伊朗仍然是最有能力争夺中东地区霸权的国家。伊朗拥有规模庞大的导弹武库仍在运转的核计划以及覆盖黎巴嫩也门、伊拉克、叙利亚和巴勒斯坦地区的代理人网络。
来源片段
From then till now, it has been just punishing the Iranian economy and even worse, I mean, the Iranian it's not like things were going gangbusters in 2023 for the Iranian economy, but even worse shape, you know, running out of water in Tehran, for example, the Iranian nuclear program absolutely battered between midnight hammer and the 12 day war in 2025 and further strikes during epic fury, absolutely hammered conventional Iranian military capabilities on somewhere on a spectrum from destroyed to degraded, the Iranian Navy will say effectively destroyed missile capabilities will say degraded sort of somewhere on that spectrum.
目标片段
此后，伊朗连续遭到打击，经济进一步恶化，德黑兰甚至面临缺水缺电。伊朗的核计划在五叶支锤行动2025年的12日战争和2026年的史诗狂怒行动中遭到反复轰炸，
S1：2 个窗口回退
来源片段
one on on April 5th Donald Trump's generals could not promise him that four or five more weeks of warfare was going to get him what he wanted and he had to look at the possibility of massive escalation where he was going to have to start targeting the defense technology and industrial base of the Iranians civilian infrastructure and so on and they were going to respond again likely going to respond against the Gulf allies and it was going to get very messy and very ugly now we're going to win that war in the end we are but it's going to be a george w bush style invasion or not an necessarily an invasion of Iran but it's going to it's going to have to take on potentially regime change aspects and there was going to be a lot of collateral damage that even the iraq war didn't
目标片段
要彻底消除伊朗威胁。美国可能必须摧毁伊朗国防工业技术体系、电网、桥梁、石化工业和其他民用军用两用基础设施，伊朗随后会攻击海湾国家。美国最终可能赢得这场战争，但是会付出极高成本，并且造成大规模附带伤害，这将不再是特朗普式的短促惩罚行动，而变成了一场不实施的长期战争，他未必需要地面入侵伊朗。但是很可能必然走向政权更迭。特朗普显然不愿意承担这种结果。
来源片段
going to respond against the Gulf allies and it was going to get very messy and very ugly now we're going to win that war in the end we are but it's going to be a george w bush style invasion or not an necessarily an invasion of Iran but it's going to it's going to have to take on potentially regime change aspects and there was going to be a lot of collateral damage that even the iraq war didn't have and donald trump looked at that and he said you know what I prefer to try to degrade them over time this mo you as ugly as it is gives me a vehicle in which I can degrade them degrade them over time so I'm not willing to go with you to say he should do x y or z until we look at the scenario that he was looking at and say yeah that's the scenario we want now donald trump also wants to
目标片段
美国最终可能赢得这场战争，但是会付出极高成本，并且造成大规模附带伤害，这将不再是特朗普式的短促惩罚行动，而变成了一场不实施的长期战争，他未必需要地面入侵伊朗。但是很可能必然走向政权更迭。特朗普显然不愿意承担这种结果。我们接下来来讨论美国关于伊朗政策的争论分成了几个阵营。第一个是奥巴马拜登阵营，这一派看到了谅解备忘录之后会说哦，特朗普最终还是变成了走回了奥巴马道路谅解备忘录和2015年的联合全面行动计划具有结构相似。
S2：4 个窗口回退
来源片段
Because if we go it alone, what will that do? They will bring the Americans in. Now, it turns out we didn't have to do that because the two-week thing that Trump said was a ruse. It was part of the military intelligence tactic against Iran to make Iran not move things out of Fordo to make Iran expect the Americans not to bomb. But at a larger level, that's exactly what happened. The Israeli willingness to go it alone, the Israeli willingness to deliver massive strategic successes, that's what brought Trump in. If the Israelis had hobbled along and tried to strike but hundreds of missiles that hit the Israeli civilian front and Israel had failed to take out launchers,
目标片段
特朗普随后进一步追问，如果再给三到四周，军方能否保证伊朗一定会屈服，那没有人能够提供这种保证。这正是特朗普改变政策的原因。战争初期，美国最重要的目标是结束伊朗核计划。但随着战争发展，他又增加了第二个目标，重新开放。霍尔木兹海峡。到了四月初，特朗普发现，即使继续轰炸三到四周，军方也无法保证同时实现这两个目标继续升级，可能把美国拖入一场规模更大、时间更长、更具有政权、更迭性质的战争。
来源片段
It was part of the military intelligence tactic against Iran to make Iran not move things out of Fordo to make Iran expect the Americans not to bomb. But at a larger level, that's exactly what happened. The Israeli willingness to go it alone, the Israeli willingness to deliver massive strategic successes, that's what brought Trump in. If the Israelis had hobbled along and tried to strike but hundreds of missiles that hit the Israeli civilian front and Israel had failed to take out launchers, failed to strike a great many of the nuclear sites, failed to decapitate half of the regime's leadership,
目标片段
OK 特朗普批准了这个行动，但是军事结果没有达到最初承诺，美国可以摧毁大量的发射架仓库和人员。但是美国无法保证消灭所有胡塞武装组织的分散的、机动的、低成本的无人机和导弹系统到了伊朗他们面对的情况更加复杂。伊朗的弹导导弹被储存在地下，导弹城里面设施具有很强的抗打击能力。一些地下设施可能超过美国现有常规弹药的有效毁伤范围。美国即使摧毁了300个目标，也无法确认剩余系统是否足以继续攻击。
来源片段
They can't launch them in any real numbers. Well, if two-thirds of three-quarters of the launchers are now gone, which is the estimate in Israel, Iran can have as many missiles as it wants. It'll have to throw them with their own bare hands to actually get them to go anywhere. And this is the point. The regime had one last great arena, one last great asset, and the Israelis have now systematically been denying them that asset in their ability to respond to the Israeli strikes on their nuclear program and missile production capabilities. And that was the missiles.
目标片段
但是美国无法保证消灭所有胡塞武装组织的分散的、机动的、低成本的无人机和导弹系统到了伊朗他们面对的情况更加复杂。伊朗的弹导导弹被储存在地下，导弹城里面设施具有很强的抗打击能力。一些地下设施可能超过美国现有常规弹药的有效毁伤范围。美国即使摧毁了300个目标，也无法确认剩余系统是否足以继续攻击。黎巴嫩的真主党也体现了同样的问题。黎巴嫩的真主党显然比2023年7月10日要来的弱的很多。今天的真主党，但是他们仍然能够使用少量无人机给以色列造成严重损失。
来源片段
And every single one of those groups systematically has begun to be dismantled and destroyed. And there is no logic to a war with Hezbollah by which it doesn't end in Iran. And so the war was only ever going to end with Iran. It makes no sense to fight all the wars up until now in the last 20 months if it doesn't end in removing the Iranian threat because Iran will launch suicidal wars for Israel's destruction, because it's not deterrable, because if it gets a nuke, no matter what the clever think tank people say in the West who have been unable to predict any development in the Middle East in 30 years, Iran might just use it.
目标片段
但是，特朗普也不是一个传统的鹰派鹰派往往假设，只要美国再坚持几周，就一定能取得彻底的胜利。军方实际上无法提供这种保证，继续升级，可能引发一场全面的地区战争，而不仅仅是完成最后一轮轰炸，武力已经摧毁了伊朗的大量能力，改变了地区力量对比。但是，武力没有办法以低廉的成本消除每一架伊朗拥有的无人机，每一枚地下导弹，也无法迫使伊朗政权立即接受美国的所有要求。因此，美国需要把军事行动制裁石油市场压力和临时协议结合起来，长期管理并且削弱伊朗。