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目标片段虽然说沙特在国内沙特国内推动经济自由化，但是他们非常乐意和圣战者和伊斯兰主义者和极端宗教分子打交道，他的历史和关系网络都是现成的，就摆在那儿。那么在叙利亚问题上，我们也可以看到，沙特谴责阿联酋说，你让阿拉伯主权碎片化了，因为我们等一会儿更加详细讨论，就是阿联酋作为一个小不拉击的，由五个酋长国组成的国家，它在中东地区，尤其是在石油海湾地区积累的权力形态和沙特非常不同，阿联酋没有沙特的规模、国土体量和人口规模。
来源片段There is a certain amount of apparently authentic pre-Islamic Arabic poetry, which gives us a sense of what the Arab tribes were up to before Islam knocked them for six. And we have some later Muslim historians and Christian historians as well. But it's fair to say that the field really is really open. So when we, on the basis of this kind of cloud of unknowing, try to figure out what Arabia was like, specifically Western Arabia, because this is a huge area. It's a kind of subcontinent, really. It's not even a peninsula on the eve of Islam. What the sources depict do give us some comfort in that they coincide with the image that we would expect given the usual kind of religious and cultural forms associated with nomadic pastoralism.
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But I think you're right that the messaging on Iran has only improved as far as Israel is concerned in the last few weeks. When the talk started, it was a little iffy for Israel. And now they're saying that Iran can't enrich Iran at all, which is good. On the Houthis, Trump announced that the Houthis were going to stop attacking ships. And there's two things. First of all, ships, not that they're going to stop attacking Israel. Number two, the Israelis were blindsided by this. I heard this from a very senior Israeli source who would have known they were really blindsided.
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但是想想伊朗对吧？伊朗最近发生的这些破事，我们在这里已经详细分析过了。在此我直接略过我。假设你们都已经知道伊朗最近在干嘛？伊朗一直以来都是一整个阿拉伯石油、海湾地区共同的敌人。至少我在那的时候，我明显的感觉到伊朗他们对于伊朗的敌意是要大于他们对以色列释放出来的敌意的。此时此刻的伊朗伊斯兰共和国已经遭到严重削弱，它的威慑结构被破坏，国内稳定性被拉扯。
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So it doesn't look great for Israel, but it also, if they didn't tell the British either, then maybe it has to do with chaos and the Trump administration. Well, what you're reminded of the many things is, I think many observers who want to constantly write about how everything is going wrong for Israel. Seize on these things as though there's a deliberate decision by, say, in this case, the US administration to make a break with Israel on something. And what they often, I think, don't fully appreciate is there's a difference between a deliberate decision made to do something in a certain way and just general chaos. And sometimes it's just general chaos.
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而不是西方投资的竞争者。沙特既想要避免伊朗政权崩塌带来的制度性风险，也想要避免伊朗实现正常化带来的战略性风险。我刚才这三个考量已经给我之前那个看似非常清晰的美国自由主义霸权的衰弱带来的新政治局势，加入了很多复杂的因素，我们必须要把所有这些东西结合起来看看沙特现在在做什么，对吧？你不能单纯的把沙特的所作所为当成说是王储突然决定拥抱穆斯林兄弟会的宗教长老了，要搞宗教极端主义了，或者你也不能够把沙特现在那些突然激进化的反以色列言论理解成是，他突然又开始在乎巴勒斯坦人权问题了。
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I hear this often from senior US administration officials who are, I would say more in the, I don't like to use the word isolationist, they're more in the, what we call the restrain, the restrainest camp where they basically say, we don't want to get involved with the Middle East. Israel's got to take care of, do what it's got to do in Gaza. They can do whatever they want. It doesn't bother us. It doesn't bother our voters. It doesn't bother our base. Like let them have at it. And so I guess, is this what you're seeing too, not just from the US, but the Saudis. I'm not saying the Saudis want to see Israel run wild in Gaza in terms of extending the war beyond what many in the region think is necessary, but is it just a general sense? Like let them figure it out. I think that when the Saudis do their like cost benefit analysis, the normalization with Israel is no longer as beneficial as it was before October 7th, just in terms of the risk they're taking from their population, because the Arab population is very much incited against Israel right now by pan Arab media, but they don't want to give up on the other elements, right?
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我刚才这三个考量已经给我之前那个看似非常清晰的美国自由主义霸权的衰弱带来的新政治局势，加入了很多复杂的因素，我们必须要把所有这些东西结合起来看看沙特现在在做什么，对吧？你不能单纯的把沙特的所作所为当成说是王储突然决定拥抱穆斯林兄弟会的宗教长老了，要搞宗教极端主义了，或者你也不能够把沙特现在那些突然激进化的反以色列言论理解成是，他突然又开始在乎巴勒斯坦人权问题了。实际上，这群海湾国的阿拉伯兄弟应该是一整个中东，最不在乎巴勒斯坦人的，反正肯定比好心的。西方大学生更加不在乎沙特阿拉伯现在看到的事实就是阿联酋在中东石油湾的地区势力，主要是被那群亲西方和反对伊斯兰主义的世俗化。
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And you see that the Israeli opposition too, I mean, Gantz in the last few days put out a statement to that effect. So saying now's not a time for Palestinian state. Yeah. Like now's not the time to discuss it. That's pretty external because it's just a reminder how this view is generally held across the Israeli political spectrum. There tends to be the sense that it's all, it's all the right. It's all the reality is that's a pretty consensus position. Yeah. At the beginning of the war, yeah, your Lapid was saying it too. Now I think he's just trying to stay quiet on the subject, but Gantz has been pretty clear on it and the Saudis want to see some kind of progress.
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我今天想说的，其实是，我认为中东会进入到一个结构性竞争的时代，它不再主要围绕一个敌人旋转，也不主要围绕美国设计的秩序框架运行。沙特阿联酋卡塔尔、土耳其、以色列各自都在用，自己不可替代的比较优势，开始抢占地区霸权。我们今天看到的沙特阿联酋决裂不是意外，更像是一个新的中东秩序的开场开场小号OK今天我们就讲到这里，希望下次你在看到中东又乱了的新闻的时候，你的脑子里面会形成一个相对更加稳定的框架。但是我想再说一次，没有什么单一的理论能够解释中东局势，这就是一团乱麻OK.
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This, of course, also reminds us, I suppose, of the fact that modern Islamism, Muslim Brotherhood, Jama'at-e-Islami, Al-Qaeda, and so forth, represent by their own acknowledgement radical break with the Islamic past because they do accept the Western model of the nation state, which alone has the right to punish, which alone has the right to enact and enforce laws, but all of that is very new in the Islamic world. Medieval Muslims confronted with something like Hamas would have been completely bewildered by it. Things have moved on. That maybe is one of the most original features of Islamic law, the fact that it is not state law, that is, scholars' law, or ultimately attributed to the divine will. Does that mean that it's, if not revolutionary, is at least potentially destabilizing of any form of political authority or political rule that does claim the sort of authority that we actually associate with political rule and states now, that once this version of law exists in the world with its universal claims, it also potentially has the ability to, in any context, to destabilize a grandizing political claims?
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我刚才这三个考量已经给我之前那个看似非常清晰的美国自由主义霸权的衰弱带来的新政治局势，加入了很多复杂的因素，我们必须要把所有这些东西结合起来看看沙特现在在做什么，对吧？你不能单纯的把沙特的所作所为当成说是王储突然决定拥抱穆斯林兄弟会的宗教长老了，要搞宗教极端主义了，或者你也不能够把沙特现在那些突然激进化的反以色列言论理解成是，他突然又开始在乎巴勒斯坦人权问题了。实际上，这群海湾国的阿拉伯兄弟应该是一整个中东，最不在乎巴勒斯坦人的，反正肯定比好心的。西方大学生更加不在乎沙特阿拉伯现在看到的事实就是阿联酋在中东石油湾的地区势力，主要是被那群亲西方和反对伊斯兰主义的世俗化。
来源片段
The fact that Israel is seen as being part of the Western world and Israelis is seen as being white, which is ridiculous because most of Israelis are from Oriental or North African origin, but this dichotomy whereby Israel is part of the world, Israel is white, Israel is settler, colonist, etc. You've heard all that academic mumbo jumbo and therefore Israel is automatically the oppressor.
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实际上，这群海湾国的阿拉伯兄弟应该是一整个中东，最不在乎巴勒斯坦人的，反正肯定比好心的。西方大学生更加不在乎沙特阿拉伯现在看到的事实就是阿联酋在中东石油湾的地区势力，主要是被那群亲西方和反对伊斯兰主义的世俗化。